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The United States and the International Court of Justice:
Coping with Antinomies
Sean D. Murphy*
Introduction
Since 1946, the United States has had an uneasy relationship with the International Court
of Justice (ICJ or World Court or Court). On the one hand, the United States embraces the rule of
law within its own society and, in principle, within the international system of states. The United
States has been and remains an active participant in cases before the Court, appearing before it
several times, more than any other state, even in recent years. On the other hand, the United
States has never been willing to submit itself to the plenary authority of the Court, and has
typically reacted negatively to decisions by the Court that are adverse to U.S. interests. As is well
known, in reaction to decisions that were reached by the Court, the United States refused to
participate in the proceedings on the merits of the case brought by Nicaragua in 1984, withdrew
from the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction in 1986, and recently terminated its acceptance of the
Court’s jurisdiction over disputes arising under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.
This chapter addresses certain salient aspects of the United States relationship with the
International Court of Justice. Following this Introduction, Part II briefly sets forth three
antinomies (i.e. equally rational but conflicting principles) in U.S. foreign relations that have had
important ramifications for the U.S. relationship with the Court from the outset. First, the United
States operates on the basis of conflicting principles with respect to the relevance of international
law and institutions for U.S. foreign policy. These conflicting principles have been referred to
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broadly in international relations theory as “realism” and “institutionalism.” Although discussion
of the intricacies of such theories is beyond the scope of this chapter, realism at its core
emphasizes the use of coercive state power in resolving inter-state disputes. The realist has little
faith in international institutions generally, insisting that they (including institutions for
international dispute resolution) do not exert any independent influence on state behavior. The
institutionalist asserts that the logic of realism does not adequately explain cooperation among
states, and thus places greater weight on the role that independent, judicial decision-making has
upon inter-state relations. The institutionalist sees long-term value in international courts as a
means of efficiently and effectively coordinating state behavior. Both approaches represent
powerful and deep-seated instincts in the American attitude toward international law and
institutions although, of the two, realism historically has tended to dominate.
Second, the United States operates on the basis of conflicting principles with respect to
whether states should be treated as equal sovereigns or as units characterized by inescapable
power differentials. While the United States historically has articulated a desire for cooperation
with other states as co-equal sovereigns — and, indeed, has been in the vanguard in many
respects in the promotion and development of international law and institutions built around the
concept of sovereign equality — the United States has innate historical and cultural
characteristics that push it toward an attitude of “exceptionalism” in its foreign policy, claiming
itself entitled, formally and informally, to be treated differently from other states. Although
similar in nature to the first antinomy stated above, this antinomy reflects certain factors quite
unique to the United States, including its present role as the pre-eminent superpower, as an
economic powerhouse, and as a country in certain respects uniquely insulated from vicissitudes
of international relations. With respect to the U.S. relationship with the International Court, this
antinomy pulls the United States toward the Court as an institution before which all states are
equal under law, but pushes it away when the Court fails to accommodate the special role of the
United States on matters such as the maintenance of international peace and security.
Third, the United States operates on the basis of conflicting principles with respect to
whether international law should be “embedded” in U.S. law, including the manner in which
international courts relate to U.S. law. On the one hand, the United States at its founding saw

adherence to international obligations as an important means of establishing the international
legitimacy and security of a nascent republic, and so adopted constitutional and judicial
principles that promoted the idea of international law as being a part of national law and as
superior to the law of the several states. On the other hand, the United States has developed
democratic and constitutional traditions that make it difficult to adhere to and to implement
internally international law. With respect to its democratic tradition, the United States has always
accepted the importance and significance of a judiciary for the resolution of disputes, but has
also viewed unelected judges as potential agents for usurping popular governance, a concern that
is aggravated when the judges in question are non-American and issuing their decisions from
afar. Further, U.S. constitutional law creates significant obstacles to adherence to international
law and institutions by dividing power between the President and the legislature, and by
maintaining a federal system that accords extensive rights to the several states.
Part III suggests that the International Court was initially designed to accommodate such
antinomies (which also exist with respect to other states, to varying degrees) by providing the
means for mediating between these conflicting principles. For example, the formal manner for
selecting judges and the types of jurisdiction granted to the Court are a means for satisfying and
cultivating those U.S. principles that favor the existence and participation in a global court, while
at the same time acknowledging certain limitations on the Court in an effort not to aggravate
conflicting principles. These techniques for mediating antinomies are discussed in the context of
the history of the U.S. relationship with the Court from its inception to modern times.
Part IV then briefly highlights the unfolding of these antimonies in some of the recent
cases of the United States before the Court, with particular attention to the Oil Platforms case,
the Israeli Wall advisory opinion, and the Breard/LaGrand/Avena cases. While the United States
fully participated in these cases and did not denounce the Court’s decisions as without basis in
law, the cases have brought the Court into square conflict with U.S. visions of realism,
exceptionalism, and constitutional autonomy.
Among other things, Part V suggests that certain formal and informal means for
mediating these antimonies may have been forgotten in the past twenty years, leading to a point
where the Court readily finds fault in the United States and the United States holds the Court in

very low regard. In particular, while the Court’s concern with its reputation and legitimacy in the
first thirty years of its existence served as an important informal constraint in the Court’s
relationship with the United States, over the past twenty years that same concern has led to
repeated clashes. The chapter concludes that these antinomies are unlikely to be resolved through
the further development of formal or informal mediating techniques. In the near term, American
policymakers will seek to avoid any involvement in matters before the Court, while the Court
will embrace opportunities to speak to the legality of U.S. actions.
1. Antinomies in the U.S. Relationship with the ICJ
An “antinomy” is a contradiction in principles that seem equally necessary and
reasonable. In U.S. foreign relations, three core antinomies simultaneously pull the country
toward and push it away from the idea of a meaningful international court. First, there is the
conflict between “realism” and “institutionalism” in the way America thinks about securing its
interests. Second, there is the conflict between the U.S. vision of itself as a unique entity that
should not be subject to the same constraints of international law and institutions to which other
states should be exposed, and the U.S. vision of engaging with co-equal sovereigns through
uniform rules on trade, human rights, and other important issues. Third, there is the conflict
between, in the first instance, U.S. democratic traditions that promote the autonomy of the U.S.
legal system and local governance over local issues and, in the second instance, the U.S.
willingness to embed its national law in international law. These antinomies — which are
presented as broad concepts though they in practice have overlapping features — have had and
will continue to have significant repercussions for the relationship with the International Court.
1.a. American Realism Versus Institutionalism
One antinomy of significance arises from the well-known divide within American

society, broadly stated, between realism and institutionalism lines of thinking.1 The social
contract theory advanced by Thomas Hobbes,2 John Locke,3 and Jean-Jacques Rousseau4 to
justify the origin of the state focused on the state as a creation by free individuals whose interests
— security, freedom, order, justice, and welfare — the state must recognize and serve. As far as
relations among states, Hobbes saw an environment of anarchy in which states fear each other,
such that a state must use its military and economic power to pursue strategies and policies that
advance that state’s interests, which invariably conflict with the interests of other states. While
bargains may be struck between states that serve their mutual interests, such bargains are not and
should not be driven by abstract ethical, moral, or legalistic considerations, and once struck are
often temporary or imposed coercively by one of the parties. Thus, international “law” (or rules
or norms) and international “institutions” (or “regimes”) may exist, but they do not exert
independent influence on states. To the extent that states are seen as abiding by such law, it is
simply because political or economic factors encourage them to do so, not because of a fidelity
to a “legal” system. Rather, states strive relentlessly to increase their relative power position visà-vis rival states regardless of international law or institutions. Frequently referred to as
“realism” in international relations theory, this line of thinking appears to be deeply entrenched
in U.S. policy-making; legions of American policy-makers are fully versed in the seminal
“realist” writings of Hans Morganthau, Thomas Schelling, and Kenneth Waltz.5
The flip side of realism is “institutionalism,” which also has a place in U.S. policymaking. Institutionalists assert that the contemporary nature of inter-state relations is
1
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demonstrably not Hobbesian; rather, there is an extraordinary amount of cooperation among
states that realism theory fails to explain. States pursue their national interests, but those interests
include a desire for international law and institutions, such as impartial inter-state dispute
settlement, since cooperation often yields far greater benefits than non-cooperation.6 Among
other things, institutionalists seek to develop a web of norms that will compel just, moral and
equitable behavior among states; to end warfare through use of collective security, disarmament,
and even criminal punishment; to use human rights as a normative tool for restraining
government abuses of its people; and to make the world safe for democracy. The intellectual
origins of institutionalism lie in the writings of Immanuel Kant, who called upon states to
establish a league of peace to prevent war.7 At key points in American history, this line of
thinking dominated U.S. foreign policy; typically reference is made to Woodrow Wilson’s
Fourteen Points after World War I, to U.S. support for the myriad multilateral institutions that
arose after World War II, and to the emphasis on human rights in the foreign policies of certain
presidents, such as Jimmy Carter. At any given time, U.S. foreign policy may have elements of
both realism and institutionalism. The current Bush administration is realist in its tendency to
resist empowerment of international organizations, but has elements of institutionalism in its
neo-conservative emphasis on the promotion of democracy.
This broad conflict in the U.S. attitude to foreign relations has affected the relationship
with the Court. On the one hand, institutionalism in the United States favors the existence of an
effective and useful global court, whether or not the U.S. wins all its cases before the Court. For
some, the very idea of a global court with an impartial panel of judges is strongly compelling;
6
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Thomas Franck has referred to such a vision as “messianic” — a belief that the rule of law
institutions that have worked so well internally for the United States must be replicated on the
international level.8 On the other hand, realism in the United States wants to maintain the ability
of the country to protect its national interests through resort to unilateral power, and to that end
has opposed a global court with plenary jurisdiction over international disputes involving it. For
Franck, this is a “chauvinist” vision, one that views the rule of law known within the United
States as unique to American history, culture, and values, such that replication of the rule of law
internationally is not only implausible but threatens national values and institutions.9 While the
institutionalist strand led to the acceptance of the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction in 1946
(discussed further in Part III), the realist strand virtually eviscerated that acceptance by attaching
reservations to the acceptance. The presence, and even swinging back and forth, of these lines of
thinking has fostered a constant tension between Washington D.C. and The Hague, especially in
recent years. Arguably the United States has pursued an impossible position of both embracing
the idea of the Court and yet distancing itself from the inevitable effects of that idea.
This antinomy is not unique to the United States; other states have similar lines of
thinking in their foreign policy. Indeed, the structural aspects built into the ICJ that are discussed
in Part III —aspects that seek to mediate between the desire of states for an impartial, permanent
judicial forum, and the desire of states to control their exposure to ICJ decision-making— may
be seen as an effort to mediate between institutionalism and realism among all states. A further
tension that arises, however, lies in the differences among states in how they strike a balance
between these lines of thinking in their relationship to the Court. On one end of the spectrum —
where realism dominates— lie China and Russia, where the institutionalism line of thinking has
never taken hold. Those states see no national interest in being exposed to the jurisdiction of the
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Court and have succeeded in never appearing before the Court in a contentious case. In effect,
China and Russia have no relationship with the Court, other than the presence of a judge of their
nationality on the Court. A little further along the spectrum is the United States, whose
relationship with the Court is dominated by realism but with a patina of institutionalism.
Much further along the spectrum —moving into where institutionalism dominates— are
the Europeans. For Europeans, the carnage of two world wars left them no choice but to opt for
an institutionalist approach to foreign relations; a forsaking of national sovereignty and national
prerogatives in favor of supra-national institutions (the European Union, with its European Court
of Justice, and the Council of Europe, with its the European Court of Human Rights) that would
generate and interpret law that would bind European states. As such, their attitude toward the
International Court leans towards the institutionalist end of the spectrum. Of the twenty-five
members of the European Union, for example, fourteen have accepted the Court’s compulsory
jurisdiction.10 Finally, also largely on the institutionalism side of the spectrum are many of the
developing states, such as Argentina, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, or Nicaragua,
all of whom currently have cases pending at the Court. For them, the balance is also oriented
toward the institutionalism approach because in most instances those states cannot rely on
military or economic power to advance their national interests. By contrast, to the extent that
embracing the Court provides a means for resolving intractable disputes among developing
states, and a possible means for restricting the power of Western developed states, the World
Court provides developing states with leverage that they would not otherwise have on their own.
So while many developing nations have declined to expose themselves to the uncertainty of the
Court’s compulsory jurisdiction, they strongly favor the Court’s existence, are quite interested in
using it when possible to resolve disputes with neighbors, and are willing to use it on occasion
against more powerful states, such as Djibouti’s current case against France.
Differences in attitudes among these groups create tension. Realism-oriented states wish
to downplay the authority and significance of the Court, wish to see it adopt a narrow approach
10
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to its jurisdiction, and are quick to challenge its integrity and impartiality whenever the
opportunity arises. Conversely, institutionalism-oriented states tend to do the opposite, thus
leading to serious divergences among states regarding the proper functioning, aim and use of the
Court.
1.b. American Exceptionalism Versus Sovereign Equality
A second antinomy of significance arises from the conflict between accepting an
international system fundamentally predicated on the equality of all states, and, at the same time,
insisting (formally and informally) upon special prerogatives for major powers, most particularly
the United States itself.11 While there are links with the “realism” line of thinking discussed
above, exceptionalism is a somewhat different concept, in that whether a realism or
institutionalism outlook is taken, the United States is often captivated by a belief that it simply
should not be treated just like every other state.
The belief in the sovereign equality of all states is a fundamental principle of U.S.
engagement in the international system. The international legal system, which the United States
has done much to promote, is constructed around the concept of “the state”, and the concept of
all states having the same fundamental rights and obligations as an incident of their statehood. As
asserted in the General Assembly’s famous Declaration on Principles of International Law:
All States enjoy sovereign equality. They have equal rights and duties and are equal
members of the international community, notwithstanding differences of an economic,
social, political or other nature. In particular, sovereign equality includes the following
elements:
1.
11

States are juridically equal;

For a detailed discussion of how international law generally mediates between the principle of sovereign
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2.

Each State enjoys the rights inherent in full sovereignty;

3.

Each State has a duty to respect the personality of other States;

4.

The territorial integrity and political independence of the State are
inviolable;

5.

Each State has the right freely to choose and develop its political, social,
economic and cultural systems.12

For this reason, the United States accepts that in the plenary bodies of international
organizations, and at international negotiations of new treaties, tiny states in terms of territory or
population (such as Nauru) are entitled to the same formal status as behemoths (such as China).
At the same time, the conflicting vision of American exceptionalism pushes back against
such notions of equality. Thus, in constructing a U.N. Security Council, the United States should
be a permanent member with special rights and privileges that protect it from Security Council
action. When establishing a World Bank or International Monetary Fund, a weighted voting
system should be created that protects U.S. influence in the development of international
economic policy. More recently, when creating international criminal tribunals, those that are
focused on a particular country (e.g. Lebanon, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, or the former Yugoslavia)
are acceptable, but an International Criminal Court is not unless the United States has an ability
to preclude prosecution of its nationals. In other words, this antinomy notes the conflict between
a vision of international law and institutions in which all states participate as equal sovereigns,
and a vision of exceptionalism by which the United States habitually reaches for policies and
structures that it alone controls, or that applies generally to states but not to itself.
Such tendency toward exceptionalism arises from a confluence of factors. Perhaps the
most important is America’s history over the past century as a country untouched by sustained
armed conflict on its soil, protected by vast oceans from any serious threat of invasion (the sense
of shock from, and aggressive response to, the isolated attacks of September 11 demonstrate this
12
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deeply felt sense of U.S. security). This history tends both to undermine arguments for why the
United States must adhere to global norms and instruments, and to foster an instinct to avoid
“entangling” alliances that might draw it into the conflicts of other states. There are many other
factors, including the demise of the Soviet empire, which eliminated the one dominant threat to
the United States; the U.S. emergence as the sole global superpower, capable of projecting
considerable power through unilateral action rather than relying on cooperation with other states;
the increasingly conservative U.S. political environment vis-à-vis other developed states
(including the existence of a concentrated and active conservative minority that, as Andrew
Moravscik has pointed out, has taken advantage of the fragmented nature of U.S. political
institutions to resist implementation of international norms12); an indifference to the norms and
institutions of other states due to a belief that American norms and institutions, over time, have
proven superior to anything found abroad (i.e., the United States leads others, it does not follow
them); a distinctive “rights culture” which emphasizes negative protections against government
interference in private liberties, and does not emphasize, unlike other Western states and
emerging democracies, activist provision by government of socio-economic and welfare rights
(i.e., entitlements to food, health care, etc.); and important relatively recent demographic and
cultural shifts that pull the United States away from even its traditional allies (i.e., the continuing
and increasing role of Christian faith in the United States as compared with the secularization of
Europe; the gradual “Islamicization” of Europe due to immigration, such that if Turkey joins the
European Union there will be more Muslims than Protestants in Europe13).
This presence of exceptionalism in U.S. relations with the World Court has two important
effects. First, exceptionalists are inherently unhappy with any international institution that can
issue pronouncements regarding the legality of U.S. conduct. For exceptionalists, an
international court may be a good thing for keeping other states in line, but the United States
almost always does the right thing and, when it does not, any repercussions should flow from
national legal and political institutions, not from abroad. Second, even when the ICJ is not
12
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passing upon the legality of U.S. conduct, the exceptionalist is skeptical about the Court because
it at times reaches conclusions that differ from those of the U.S. government, and therefore (for
the exceptionalist) the Court is simply wrong.
1.c. Autonomous National Law Versus National Law Embedded in International
Law
A third antinomy arises from the conflict between favoring a national legal system that is
embedded in international law, as a means of ensuring U.S. adherence to and implementation of
its international obligations, and disfavoring such incorporation to the extent that it transgresses
national democratic and constitutional traditions that promote diffusion of power and governance
of persons by their freely elected officials.
The United States at its founding saw adherence to international obligations as an
important means of establishing the international legitimacy and security of a nascent republic,
and so adopted constitutional and judicial principles that international law was a part of national
law and superior to the law of the several states. The U.S. Constitution provides for treaties to be
part of the “supreme law of the land”14 and provides for the supremacy of federal law over state
law.15 Further, the Supreme Court has been favorably disposed toward the incorporation of
customary international law into U.S. law,16 and to its interpretation whenever possible so as to
14

U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2.

15

Id.

16
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their independence, they were bound to receive the law of nations, in its modern state of purity and refinement.”);
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avoid conflicts with international law.17
At the same time, strong currents in the American constitutional and democratic tradition
seek to keep international law at a distance, such as through the doctrine of non-self-executing
treaties and the trumping of customary international law by later-in-time statutes or “controlling
executive acts.”18 Further, from the beginning of its history, America has been proud of the
manner in which it has divided power among the three branches of its federal government, and
between the federal government and the several states. Such division of power was designed to
promote a democratic but well-functioning government, and to preclude concentration of power
in a single organ. While this constitutional tradition is a marvel, there can be little doubt that it
has impeded the integration of the United States into the international legal system. Dividing
power between the President and the Senate may have helped prevent the emergence of an
American monarch in foreign policy, but it has also prevented presidents from embracing broadranging jurisdiction of a global court from the early twentieth century forward. Restraining the
federal government from being able to regulate on certain matters of individual rights prevents a
governmental denial of civil liberties, but places the United States in a difficult position
internationally on matters such as regulating the freedom of speech of the tobacco industry or on
matters of race. Dividing power between the federal government and the several states allows for
greater local governance and numerous “laboratories” for developing laws, but it also makes it
extraordinarily difficult for the United State to adhere to international norms that require greater
national uniformity.
Consequently, there is an enduring schizophrenia in the U.S. constitutional and
democratic tradition regarding the manner in which it incorporates international law, and this
conflict is aggravated when the issue of courts is added to the picture. The United States has
“narrow areas” in which “federal common law” continues to exist); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729
(2004) (“For two centuries we have affirmed that the domestic law of the United States recognizes the law of
nations.”).
17
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always accepted the importance and significance of a judiciary for the resolution of disputes; the
importance and legacy of the Supreme Court from the early American republic to the present is
ingrained in every American schoolchild. Yet the American democratic tradition strongly favors
rule by the people principally through their popularly-elected officials, such that there is an
enduring suspicion of judges (local, let alone foreign) whose decisions do not hew closely to the
laws enacted by the people. By and large, Americans do not favor their judges undertaking
teleological interpretations of law; to the extent that laws need to be adapted, they look to the
legislatures to do it. U.S. judges have been activist at times, both for conservative and liberal
causes, but the practice does not sit well with the American democratic tradition, and repeatedly
evokes controversy. This conflict between a belief in an independent judiciary and distrust of
activist judges explains in part the country’s ambivalence to the International Court (as well as
efforts in some quarters to prevent judges from applying in U.S. courts norms generated outside
the United States, whether formed by customary international law, within treaty regimes, or
otherwise).
As discussed in Part IV, this antinomy recently has presented the U.S. government with
difficult issues regarding the relationship of International Court decisions to the conduct of the
law enforcement officials and courts of the several U.S. states.19 Among other things, it has led
to the acknowledgment that final judgments of the International Court are binding as a matter of
international law, but to assertions by the Executive Branch that such judgments have no direct
effect within the national legal system.
2. Techniques for Mediating the Antinomies
The World Court uses certain methods or mechanisms, formal or informal, to mediate the
18
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Eur. J. Int’l L. 783 (2004) (“The democratic tradition of the US, in which the government cannot rely on a majority
in the legislature, sometimes stands in the way of the acceptance of rulings by ‘unelected’ international judges. Fifty
state systems differ in their respect for international rulings.”)

antinomies discussed above. Such techniques do not attempt to eliminate either of the conflicting
principles captured by those antinomies; rather, the techniques take for granted the antinomies
and seek to find a path between the conflicts presented. In essence, mediating techniques20 seek
to play to tendencies of institutionalism, of sovereign equality, and of incorporation of
international law into national law, while accepting that conflicting principles of
realism/institutionalism,

exceptionalism/sovereign

equality,

and

autonomous

national

law/embedded national law circumscribe the role the Court may play. The discussion of such
techniques below is combined with brief highlights of the history of the U.S. relationship with
the International Court.
As is well-known, the predecessor to the International Court of Justice —the Permanent
Court of International Justice (PCIJ)— was created in the aftermath of World War I. Caught up
in the rising tide of institutionalism of the late nineteenth/early twentieth century, and believing
that that reliance solely on international arbitration for resolution of inter-state disputes was not
good enough, the United States became actively engaged in the negotiations that led to the
establishment of the PCIJ.21 Though arbitration had a role to play, American international
20
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but that interest for more than 100 years was principally focused on disputes with its “mother country,” the United
Kingdom. The Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, Nov. 19, 1794, U.S.-U.K., 8 Stat. 116, T.S. No. 105
(commonly referred to as the “Jay Treaty” after U.S. Secretary of State John Jay), established three boards of
arbitration to resolve disputes between the United Kingdom and its former colony. The Treaty of Washington, May
8, 1871, U.S.-U.K., 17 Stat. 863, T.S. No. 133, established four arbitrations for addressing Britain’s conduct during
the U.S. civil war, including Britain’s responsibility for allowing the construction of the Confederate raider
Alabama. See Tom Bingham, The Alabama Claims Arbitration, 54 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 1 (2005). Other U.S./U.K.
arbitrations addressed fur seals, the Venezuela-British Guiana boundary, and Alaska. In the years leading up to
World War I, the United States entered into a few treaties providing for international arbitration, principally with
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lawyers and policy-makers —such as Elihu Root— argued that it tended toward “an essentially
political process of negotiation and compromise on the basis of expedience rather than the
judicial procedure of impartial adjudication of rights and duties in strict accordance with the
rules of law.”22 The latter process was an option that states should have, since judicial decisions,
being grounded more firmly in a rigorous application of law by persons not selected by the
disputants, could serve as a means for definitively and convincingly resolving certain kinds of
disputes. The United States had pressed without success for the creation of such a court at the
1907 Hague peace conference; now, after the carnage of world war, other states were willing to
go along.
As is also well-known, however, the U.S. Senate never consented to ratification of the
Covenant of the League of Nations, nor of the separate protocol embodying the Statute of the
PCIJ. While the PCIJ had its supporters in the United States, strong voices of realism and
exceptionalism, particularly in the U.S. Senate, argued that submission to the jurisdiction of a
world court would harm national interests, and would diminish or jeopardize national
sovereignty. When put to a vote in 1935, adherence to the protocol secured 52 votes in favor and
36 against, thus falling seven votes short of a two-thirds majority.23 Throughout the life of the
PCIJ from 1922 to 1945 —during which time the court issued 27 advisory opinions and 32
judgments24— the United States never participated in any litigation before the court, although an

The other principal U.S. inter-state arbitration prior to World War II concerned Mexico. In September
1923, the United States and Mexico signed a convention in Washington D.C. (which took effect in March 1924)
creating a General Claims Commission. The purpose of the commission was to settle claims arising after July 4,
1868, “against one government by nationals of the other for losses or damages suffered by such nationals or their
properties” and “for losses or damages originating from acts of officials or others acting for either government and
resulting in injustice.” Composed of three members (from the U.S., from Mexico, and from a third country), the
Commission met from 1924 to 1937 in Washington, D.C. and Mexico City. Final settlement was reached in 1941.
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American judge always served on the Court.25 The substantive and procedural decisions of the
PCIJ remain of interest today, since the Statute of the ICJ is essentially the same as that of its
predecessor. Indeed, while states decided in the aftermath of World War II to create a new
international court, they also decided to maintain continuity in its concept and function.26
Unlike the experience with the League, the United States joined the United Nations in
1945 and therefore ipso facto became a party to the ICJ statute.27 Institutionalists emphasized
that the success of a new system of international organizations to maintain peace and security,
one built upon the rule of law, necessarily entailed the creation of an international court. The
U.S. delegation to the San Francisco conference reported to President Franklin D. Roosevelt that
“[a]s the United States becomes a party to a Charter which places justice and international law
among its foundation stones, it would naturally accept and use an international court to apply
international law and to administer international justice.”28 Testifying prior to the Senate’s
consent to ratification, the head of the U.S. delegation in San Francisco, Edward Stettinius,
asserted that the Court will “have a most important part to play in the further development and
strengthening of international law, just as the courts of England and America have helped to
form the common law.”29 The State Department Legal Adviser (and later first American judge
on the new Court), testified that the United States historically stood for
“….the settlement of international cases by the judicial process; that we did try as
far back as 1907 to establish a court; that such a court was established in 1922 and has
25
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Francisco Conference).

been functioning ever since, and that while we did not go into that Court, there was
strong sentiment in this country, as you well know, for our becoming a party. Here we
have provision for a Court, in the creation of which we have played an important part.
Speaking for myself and for those who have been associated with me in this work, I think
that we cannot too strongly urge . . . that we have here provided for the creation of an
International Court of Justice that will be worthy of the name, and one that will make a
great contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security. The Court is
not as spectacular as some of the other organizations provided for in the Charter, but we
think that it will serve an extremely important purpose, and that an International
Organization without such a Court would be lacking in a very important essential”.30
The UN Charter and the Court, of course, had their realists and exceptionalists detractors;
some argued among other things that adherence to the Charter would “make slaves of our free
citizens,”31 and that the ICJ would unconstitutionally usurp the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
“over all foreign disputes of this Nation.”32 Notwithstanding such views, the Senate in 1945 gave
consent to ratification of the Charter, by a vote of 89 to 2.33
Even so, the United States did not embrace an international court that held wide-ranging
and unconstrained authority. Structural aspects built into the Court sought to mediate between
the desire of all states (including the United States) for an impartial, permanent judicial forum,
and the desire of states to control their exposure to ICJ decision-making (and, when exposed, to
have their concerns be fairly heard and understood).
2.a. Only States, Not Persons
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Id. at 344 (statement of Green H. Hackworth, U.S. Department of State Legal Adviser).
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of America).
32
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33

91 Cong. Rec. 8190 (1945).

At the time of the creation of the International Court, the idea that individuals might
themselves pursue claims before an international tribunal was largely unknown. Consequently,
the Statute of the Court provides that only states may appear before it in contentious cases, thus
precluding voices that are not vested in the overall system of state sovereignty. This is an
important design feature that provides states with a much greater comfort level regarding their
exposure to the jurisdiction of the Court. Although today several states have accepted
international courts that allow individuals to sue their own governments —such as the European
Court of Human Rights— many others (including the United States) have been unwilling to do
so. Were the International Court to have such jurisdiction, it would be a serious obstacle for U.S.
participation, for it would invariably result in the Court passing upon matters that traditionally
have been handled solely within the national legal system.
2.b.- Circumscribed Jurisdiction
The dominant structural aspect controlling a state’s exposure to the ICJ is that states
cannot be sued absent their consent. While there was considerable support at the San Francisco
conference in favor of making the Court’s jurisdiction compulsory, the United States and the
Soviet Union were adamantly opposed. Faced with a deal-breaker, the other nations backed
down.34 Consequently, under the Court’s statute, consent to jurisdiction does not exist merely by
virtue of a state being a party to the statute; separate express consent must exist. This
requirement of state consent is why most of the 192 UN member states have never appeared
before the Court in a contentious case, and why the Court is regarded as an important but not
dominant player in the field of international dispute resolution.
While consent is needed, the statute is structured so as to make giving such consent as
easy as possible. First, states can accept the Court’s jurisdiction on an ad hoc basis for the
adjudication of an existing dispute.35 For example, the United States and Canada in 1981 jointly
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Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 36(1), 59 Stat. 1055, 3 Bemis 1153 [hereinafter ICJ

agreed to bring to the Court a dispute over their maritime boundary.36 That case, however, was
the last time the United States agreed to bring a dispute to the Court on an ad hoc basis. Instead,
bilateral disputes that might have been addressed by the Court under its ad hoc jurisdiction have
been dealt with through bilateral negotiation37 or through bilateral arbitration.38 The United
States has also promoted ad hoc arbitration directly between injured nationals and foreign states
by coercing foreign states into accepting such jurisdiction.39
Second, states can adhere to a bilateral or multilateral treaty that expressly provides for
International Court jurisdiction when cases arise relating to the interpretation or application of
the treaty.40 (Treaties pre-dating the existence of the ICJ that provide for jurisdiction of the PCIJ
are also regarded, under the statute as triggering ICJ jurisdiction41). This form of jurisdiction is
inherently limited, for the jurisdiction only arises from matters within the scope of the treaty. The
narrower the scope of the treaty, the narrower the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction. The breadth
of the treaty may be addressed by including within it only a limited set of positive rights or
obligations; it may also be addressed by clauses within the treaty that carve out issues, such as
matters relating to national security.
Moreover, when ratifying a treaty providing for the World Court’s jurisdiction over
disputes, a state may be entitled to file a reservation to the provision on dispute resolution. For
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example, the Genocide Convention42 sets forth various obligations of states with respect to
preventing and punishing genocide, and it further provides that disputes arising under the
convention between parties shall be submitted to the ICJ at the request of one of the parties.43
However, when the United States ratified the Genocide Convention in 1988, it stated that before
any dispute could be submitted to the Court under Article IX, “the specific consent of the United
States is required in each case.”44 Consequently, when Yugoslavia in 1999 sought to sue the
United States under the Genocide Convention (for acts associated with the intervention in
Kosovo), the ICJ found that —in light of the American reservation— there was no jurisdiction
and therefore dismissed the case.45
The United States is a party to many treaties that confer jurisdiction on the Court,
enabling it to sue and be sued thereunder.46 In the wake of the Nicaragua decision (discussed
below), there has been repeated discussion within the U.S. government of withdrawing from
dispute resolution provisions under such treaties, but the technical and political difficulties of
doing so have so far left most of those provisions intact.
The last case brought to the Court by the United States under this form of jurisdiction was
by an application filed in 1987 in the ELSI case.47 In that case, the United States invoked a
compromissory clause contained in a 1948 bilateral Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and
Navigation that provided for Court jurisdiction over disputes arising under that treaty.48 The U.S.
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claim alleged expropriation of and interference with property of an American company’s
subsidiary in Sicily. The Court ultimately concluded that no harm had occurred from the alleged
acts.
Since the ELSI case, the only other dispute pursued by the United States that might have
led to the filing of an independent49 claim before the International Court appears to have been the
“hushkits” dispute between the United States and Europe. On March 14, 2000, the United States
initiated a dispute resolution proceeding by filing an application and memorial before the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Council in its capacity as a judicial body.50
The dispute concerned a European Union (EU) regulation adopted in 1999 relating to aircraft
noise —one that imposed design-based restrictions on aircraft registered in, or operating into,
Europe. In November 2000, the Council rejected certain preliminary objections raised by the
European Union.51 In the aftermath of the ICAO Council decision, neither the United States nor
EU member states exercised their right to appeal the Council’s decision to the International
Court of Justice, in accordance with the procedure set forth in the Chicago Convention.52 Rather,
49
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the EU member states filed their counter-memorial in December 2000 and the parties thereafter
settled the matter.53
Since the 1980’s, the United States has consistently declined to accept or incorporate into
treaties compromissory clauses calling for adjudication of disputes by the International Court of
Justice. If the United States adheres to major multilateral treaties (such as the Genocide
Convention) which contain such a clause, then the government typically files a reservation to
that clause. If the United States adheres to major multilateral treaties that allow parties to opt for
ICJ jurisdiction, then it declines to do so. Thus, should the United States ratify the 1982 U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea, it has already announced that it will opt for compulsory
arbitral dispute resolution, not resolution by the International Court.54 U.S. bilateral investment
treaties (BITs) now invariably call for investor-state arbitration before the International Centre
for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) or another forum,55 a striking contrast to the
earlier generation of treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation (FCN treaties), which
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provided for ICJ jurisdiction over state-to-state disputes. Investment disputes arising under the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) are also sent to investor-state arbitration
before ICSID56 or an ad hoc panel operating under the UNCITRAL rules.57 U.S. trade disputes
—under agreements completed in the past fifteen years— are placed before World Trade
Organization (WTO) panels,58 panels operating under NAFTA Chapter 1959 or 20,60 or panels
operating under bilateral trade agreements;61 they are not submitted to the International Court.
Third, under what is known as the “optional clause,” the states parties to the ICJ Statute
may by means of a unilateral declaration undertake that “they recognize as compulsory ipso facto
and without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the
jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes . . .” involving issues of law or fact governed by
rules of international law.62 In 1946, the United States accepted the Court’s compulsory
jurisdiction, hoping that doing so would encourage other states to follow suit.63 At the same time,
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United Nations, asserted:
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it placed in its declaration certain reservations, including the so-called “Connally reservation” (or
“amendment”) which excluded from the jurisdiction of the Court “disputes with regard to
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States of America as
determined by the United States of America” (emphasis added). The purpose of this “selfjudging” clause was to ensure that the U. S. government and not the Court’s judges would
decide, as a practical matter, whether a dispute is “domestic” in character and consequently
outside the Court’s jurisdiction. Since such a reservation in essence forecloses the ability of the
Court to decide whether it has jurisdiction in a case,64 many scholars and some ICJ judges have
expressed doubts as to whether such a reservation is permissible,65 but to date the Court has not
definitively addressed the issue.
Early in the life of the Court, the Connally reservation proved to be a double-edged
sword. Since the Court operates on a principle of reciprocity in application of its compulsory
jurisdiction,66 the reservation had the effect of entitling any state the United States wished to sue
to invoke the reservation against the United States. When the United States sued Bulgaria in
1957 for an attack on an El Al aircraft flying over Bulgarian territory (resulting, among other
the development of procedures of pacific settlement. In these procedures, the role and functions of law is
clear. We feel that international law is already sufficiently developed to serve as a guide and basis in
international relations. We feel further that the best way of assuring its further development, and the only
way of enabling it to fulfill its function, is by referring to a responsible international tribunal all disputes
properly justiciable by such a tribunal.”
See 15 State Dep’t Bull. 452 (Sept. 1, 1946). For Senate consideration, see Compulsory Jurisdiction,
International Court of Justice: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on S.
Res. 196, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946); see also S. Rep. No. 1835, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946) (report of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee).
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things, in the death of six American nationals), Bulgaria responded that the matter was
“essentially within” Bulgaria’s “domestic jurisdiction,” and thus outside the jurisdiction of the
Court. The United States at first objected that such a response was in bad faith, but ultimately
concluded that allowing the Court to decide whether it was in bad faith would defeat the entire
point of the reservation, and so withdrew its case.67
While in theory the Connally reservation could be invoked at will, the United States
declined to do so in the case brought by Nicaragua in 1984, no doubt because it simply was not
credible to declare that American attacks allegedly occurring in Nicaraguan territory were
matters “essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States.” When the Court
rejected other jurisdictional objections raised by the United States in the Nicaragua case,68 in
October 1985 the U.S. government announced that it was terminating its declaration accepting
compulsory jurisdiction, in accordance with the terms of the U.S. declaration.69 The termination
became effective in 1986 and remains so today.
The reasons stated for terminating the declaration fell broadly into four areas.70 First, the
United States was clearly upset at the Court for finding that jurisdiction existed over Nicaragua’s
case, which resulted in the judges wading into the highly-charged politics of President Reagan’s
Latin American policy. For the U.S. government, the Court’s decision that Nicaragua had
accepted the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction, that El Salvador could not intervene at the
67
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jurisdiction stage, and that Nicaragua’s claims were justiciable, simply could not be correct as a
matter of law. Second, the United States asserted that the benefits anticipated from accepting the
Court’s compulsory jurisdiction had not materialized. Originally, the United States accepted the
Court’s compulsory jurisdiction in the hope that other states would follow, but most states had
not done so, including China and the Soviet Union. Further, most of the cases that had advanced
to the merits were not based on the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction, and therefore such
jurisdiction had not become a principal part of the Court’s overall jurisprudence. The United
States itself had tried seven times to sue a state before the ICJ on the basis of compulsory
jurisdiction, but had never been successful in doing so.71 Third, the United States emphasized the
costs of adherence to the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction. Three states had sued the United
States on the basis of such jurisdiction.72 Besides, other states could undertake “hit-and-run”
tactics, by waiting until they wished to sue the United States before filing a declaration accepting
the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction, and then after filing the case, withdrawing that declaration
to avoid being sued. Finally, the United States attacked the credibility and impartiality of the
judges of the Court, noting that most came from states that had not accepted the Court’s
compulsory jurisdiction. Moreover, since the judges must be elected by the General Assembly,
and since the majority of states in the Assembly did not, and still do not, share the U.S. view on
important international questions (including the special position of the permanent members of
the Security Council in maintaining international peace and security), “[o]ne reasonably may
expect at least some of the judges to be sensitive to the impact of their decisions on their standing
with the U.N. majority.”73 Be that as it may, arguably the withdrawal of the acceptance of the
Committee (Dec. 4, 1985), reprinted in 86 Dep’t of State Bull. 67 (Jan. 1986) [hereinafter Sofaer Testimony].
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United States by noting that: (1) of the 115 judgments and advisory opinions issued between 1948 and 1985, the
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Court’s compulsory jurisdiction was, from the start, of little practical import, given the nature,
scope, and effect of the Connally reservation.
While the termination of this acceptance of the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction may be
unfortunate, the United States is in good company. The only permanent member of the Security
Council that currently accepts the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction is the United Kingdom;
China, France, and Russia do not. Further, the United Kingdom’s acceptance is conditioned by
several significant reservations that make it quite difficult to sue it before the Court. Moreover,
the vast majority of states have not accepted the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction. Of 192
member states of the United Nations, only 65 have accepted the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction
as of January 200574, and many of those acceptances contain significant conditions and
reservations.75
2.c. State Influence on Selection of Judges
Once exposed to ICJ decision-making, other structural aspects help assure states that their
concerns will be fairly heard and understood. One such structural aspect is the manner in which
judges are elected to the court. On the one hand, the de jure procedure entails a concurrent
election of judges by the two principal organs of the United Nations (the General Assembly and
the Security Council)76 based on the independence, character, and expertise of persons, and not
on their nationality.77 While judges are precluded from participating in cases in which they were
previously involved (which, sometimes, can have the effect of preventing judges from sitting in
some cases involving their own states),78 there is no absolute bar to a judge sitting in a case
contention of bias”; and (3) “[i]n none of these cases could the majority be said to have taken a position that was
contrary in any way to the U.S. national interest.” See Thomas M. Franck, Judging the World Court 37 (1986).
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involving a state of the judge’s nationality.79 The judges serve for nine-year terms and cannot be
recalled or dismissed by the government of their nationalities during their tenure.
On the other hand, the procedure for selection of judges is not blind to nationality. No
two judges on the court may be of the same nationality.80 The judges are to be selected so that
the principal legal systems of the world are represented81 and, as an informal matter, the seats of
the judges on the Court are allocated according to regional quotas.82 In contentious cases, if a
party has no judge of its nationality sitting on the court, it may appoint an ad hoc judge to sit in
the case.83 Further, while the permanent members of the Security Council do not have a “veto”
with respect to the election of ICJ judges (a simple majority of eight votes is required),84 the five
permanent members are in a position to influence strongly the process. It should be no surprise
that they have always had one of their nationals on the Court’s bench.85
Having a judge of the state’s nationality (or the state’s region), of course, does not
guarantee a decision in the state’s favor. Cases are decided by majority of the whole bench. No
“veto” power is accorded to judges from particular states. Moreover, some (but not all) studies
indicate that historically judges have not automatically sided with their state of nationality.86
79
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Even so, the Statute provides a means for two contending states to move the center of
gravity of the Court closer to their value systems. Article 26 of the Statute allows the Court to
establish a chamber (i.e. a small sub-group of the whole bench) of judges to decide a case. The
Court typically is inclined to do so, if both parties request it and identify the judges they wish
appointed to such a chamber. Moreover, unlike under the Statute of the PCIJ, the chamber does
not need to represent “the principal legal systems of the world;”87 it can consist of judges from
just certain regions. Thus, in the Gulf of Maine case, Canada and the United States informed the
Court that they wished a chamber formed consisting of five judges identified by the parties.88 In
the ELSI case, Italy and the United States informed the Court that they too wished to have a
chamber consisting of five specific judges.89 In both cases, the states were clearly interested in
having greater control over the legal and political attitudes being brought to the judicial table,
and in both cases the Court played along. Despite this nod toward party control, the judgments of
the chambers are technically90 and in practice, regarded as judgments of the Court as a whole.
In addition to jurisdiction over contentious cases between two states, the Court also has
jurisdiction to issue advisory opinions on legal questions. The advisory jurisdiction may be
invoked only by U.N. organs and by some of the specialized agencies of the United Nations and
the opinions, by definition, are non-binding. Nevertheless, advisory opinions have juridical
authority; they can serve to legitimate certain conduct of states and organizations, and invariably
have significance for a legal system in which judicial precedents are scarce. In practice, advisory
Int’l Cts. & Tribunals 27, 32 (2003); but see Eric A. Posner & Miguel de Figueiredo, Is the International Court of
Justice Politically Biased? (unpublished draft dated Oct. 2004);Eric Posner, The Decline of the International Court
of Justice (unpublished draft) (finding that ICJ judges do not apply the law impartially but favor the interests of their
home states or like-minded states).
87
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opinions are relied upon and cited as legal authority as frequently as judgments rendered in
contentious cases.
2.d. No Direct Enforcement of Judgments In National Law
International tribunals differ markedly in the manner in which their decisions are
“embedded” in the national systems of the states that are subject to the tribunal’s jurisdiction.91
Agreements creating international tribunals can make decisions directly enforceable in a national
legal system, without any need for governments to take post-hoc implementing action (e.g.,
through statutes or executive orders). This, too, is a technique for mediating between conflicting
visions of what the tribunal should be.
In the spirit of institutionalism, ICJ judgments in contentious cases are binding on the
parties, final, and without appeal.92 Further, by the UN Charter, each U.N. member “undertakes
to comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a
party.”93 Yet, when drafting the U.N. Charter and the ICJ Statute, states elected not to include
any provisions addressing the legal effect of ICJ judgments within national legal systems, such
as whether they provide a basis for private rights of action in national courts. Seen from the U.S.
point of view, this is consistent with autonomous democratic and constitutional traditions.
Moreover, as a concession to exceptionalism, the U.N. Charter provides that a party that
prevailed before the Court may to submit non-compliance with the ruling to the scrutiny of the
U.N. Security Council, “which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide
upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment.”94 Of all the cases decided on the
merits in the Court’s history, in only one did an applicant —Nicaragua— request that the
Security Council take action to enforce the judgment. Needless to say, the United States vetoed a
91
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resolution to that effect.95 An effort by private individuals to sue the U.S. government in U.S.
courts based, among other things, on the ground that U.S. actions violated the Court’s decision,
was dismissed because there is no private right of action to enforce an International Court
decision in U.S. courts.96
2.e. Discursive and Political Constraints
Besides formal or quasi-formal techniques, there are also certain political constraints that
operate to mediate the antinomies.97 The Court knows that its legitimacy and credibility as an
institution rest not only on the objective correctness of its legal reasoning, but on the acceptance
of that legal reasoning by international lawyers, and more broadly by the global community of
states.
Arguably “judicial law-making that consistently results in the loss of dispute settlement
cases by a powerful member (as both a complainant and a respondent) would not be sustainable
politically, for it would constitute a shift in property rights that would likely engender a political
reaction.”98 As U.S. Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter once wrote with respect to the U.S.
Supreme Court:
“…the Court’s authority —possessed of neither the purse nor the sword—
ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its moral sanction. Such feeling must be
nourished by the Court’s complete detachment, in fact and in appearance, from political
95
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entanglements and by abstention from injecting itself into the clash of political forces in
political settlements.”99
The International Court is unlikely to issue a decision that, though perhaps regarded by
its judges as soundly based in law, is regarded by international lawyers generally as misguided,
or by the global community at large as politically unacceptable. Were it to do so, its viability
could be severely impaired. Instead, it strives to issue decisions that are likely to be wellreceived within the international legal community and by its primary constituents: states. By
doing so, it helps encourage states to submit cases, which in turn justifies its own significance
and importance.
To a certain extent, this mediating technique has operated in the context of
“admissibility” doctrines. Even if the Court finds that it has jurisdiction over a case, sometimes
the Court has refused to pass upon the merits of the case. In doing so, the Court spares itself
coming into conflict with certain aspects of the antimonies discussed above. For example, in
certain cases it has relied upon the rule of customary international law known as the “local
remedies rule” as a means of respecting decision-making by states within their national systems.
Under the rule, before a state may espouse a claim on behalf of its national, it must be shown that
the latter has exhausted all available legal remedies in the courts and before the administrative
agencies of the state against which the claim is brought. In 1959, the United States successfully
avoided suit before the ICJ by invoking this rule;100 in doing so, the Court in effect accepted that
resolution of a dispute, at least in the first instance, should be left to U.S. courts. In another case
where the United States was the claimant, it successfully proved to the Court that the rule was
satisfied.101 In theory, the rule aims to permit states to remedy wrongs at the national level before
they become a dispute on the international plane, where it might disrupt unnecessarily
international relations. In practice, however, it also provides the Court with an opportunity to
decline to pass upon a dispute that could place it in direct conflict with the tendency of some
states toward strong constitutional autonomy. Similarly, the Court at times has seized upon
99
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to avoid passing upon highly-charged disputes.

Even if a case reaches the merits phase, it is possible to detect judicial reasoning that
reflects sensitivity to the political limits of the Court’s authority. In the Nuclear Weapons
advisory opinion, the Court engaged in a systematic analysis of why treaties and customary rules
of international law did not prohibit the possession or use of nuclear weapons, and then why
certain principles of international humanitarian law did prohibit such use. The Court, however,
could not quite bring itself to declare nuclear weapons unlawful in all circumstances. No doubt
several of the judges were sensitive to the fact that nuclear weapons were unlikely to be
eliminated because of a decision by the Court, and that the most powerful states in the world
rejected the idea that the possession and use of such weapons were in all circumstances unlawful.
Further, the judges were no doubt conscious that a decision to that effect was not firmly
grounded in international law; there were certainly no treaties that expressly stated as much and
the application of principles of international humanitarian law was plausible but not obvious.
Consequently, the final conclusion reached was that the use of nuclear weapons as a general
matter was unlawful, but that, in certain extreme circumstances involving the very survival of a
state, such use might be lawful. Although this conclusion is problematic as a matter of legal
analysis, it was a politically shrewd move by the Court, giving to the anti-nuclear movement
strong language against the legality of nuclear weapons, while allowing powerful states a basis
for maintaining the status quo.
3. A Look at U.S. Cases Before the ICJ
3.a. The Overall Track Record
Out of a total 105 contentious cases filed before the Court from 1946 to 2004, the United
States was involved in twenty-one.104. No other state has appeared before the Court so
frequently. Moreover, other major powers such as China and Russia have never appeared before
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the Court in a contentious case.
In ten of the twenty-one cases, the United States was the applicant (or jointly agreed to
the submission of the case to the Court), and the United States:
secured a boundary decision regarded by many as favorable to the U.S.
position;105
won one on the merits;106
lost one on the merits;107
had to withdraw or accept removal of seven cases against Soviet bloc
states due to lack of jurisdiction.108
In eleven cases, the United States was the respondent, and:
two were settled or withdrawn prior to a decision on the merits by the
109

Court,

three were dismissed by the Court on jurisdictional or admissibility
105

See Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary of the Gulf of Maine Area, 1984 ICJ 246 (judgment of Oct.

106

United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 ICJ 3 (judgment of May 24).

12).
Although this judgment was in the United States favor, the Court concluded its decision by chastising the United
States for its failed effort to rescue the hostages in April 1980 (involving the death of eight U.S. soldiers), which the
United States undertook from a belief that “the situation in Iran posed mounting dangers to the safety of the hostages
. . . .” Id., para. 32. The Court informed the United States that the operation was “of a kind calculated to undermine
respect for the judicial process in international relations.” Id., para. 93.
107

See Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 ICJ 15 (judgment of July 20).

108

Aerial Incident of 27 July 1955 (U.S. v. Bulgaria), 1960 ICJ 146 (order of May 30); Aerial Incident of 7

November 1954 (U.S. v. U.S.S.R.), 1959 ICJ 276 (order of Oct. 7); Aerial Incident of 4 September 1954 (U.S. v.
U.S.S.R.), 1958 ICJ 158 (order of Dec. 9); Aerial Incident of 10 March 1953 (U.S. v. Czech.), 1956 ICJ 6 (order of
Mar. 14); Aerial Incident of 7 October 1952 (U.S. v. U.S.S.R.), 1956 ICJ 9 (order of Mar. 14); Treatment in
Hungary of Aircraft and Crew of the United States of America (U.S. v. Hungary), 1954 ICJ 99 (order of July 12);
Treatment in Hungary of Aircraft and Crew of the United States of America (U.S. v. U.S.S.R.), 1954 ICJ 103 (order
of July 12).
109

See Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988 (Iran v. U.S.), 1996 ICJ 9 (Feb. 22) (ordering discontinuance of the

case following a settlement); Questions of Interpretation and Application Arising from the Aerial Incident at
Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), 2003 ICJ 152 (Order of Sept. 10) (ordering discontinuance of the case).

36

110

grounds,

one was won on the merits,111
one was partially won and partially lost on the merits;112
four were lost on the merits.113
Of the cases lost on the merits, none was taken to a damages phase, so the existence of a
monetary judgment against the United States has not arisen.
As for whether it is possible to detect any trends looking at these cases chronologically,
there might be said to be four periods:

High

hopes Several efforts by the United States to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court,

(1950-1959)

without success; at the same time, success in avoiding the Court’s
jurisdiction.

Benign

neglect Lengthy period viewing the Court as either a failure or as inconsequential.

(1960-1979)
Re-engagement
and

Return to the Court to handle both a territorial dispute and a major political

rejection crisis; bitter rejection of the Court after losing a politically-charged Cold

(1980-87)
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Playing defense Declining to bring any cases; aggressively defending against cases brought
(1988-present)

by others; resisting the Court without breaking from it; a turn to other fora
(WTO; NAFTA; ICSID; UNCLOS arbitration)

In addition to the Court’s contentious jurisdiction, from 1946 to 2005, the International
Court of Justice issued 24 advisory opinions. The United States was involved in 22 of those
advisory opinions either in the form of written or oral pleadings.114 Again, no other state has
participated in advisory proceedings so frequently. It is harder to see any discernible trends in
this practice, although it appears that the United States was more enthusiastic about using the
Court’s advisory opinion jurisdiction early in the life of the Court, when it had greater influence
in the General Assembly. In more recent years (e.g., the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion; the
Israeli Wall advisory opinion), the United States has opposed the asking of certain questions to
the Court and, once asked, has argued that the Court should decline to answer the question.
3.b. Recent Cases
3.b.I. Oil Platforms case
The realism/institutionalism antinomy is evident in the recent Oil Platforms case. The
institutionalism strain in U.S. thinking resulted in the acceptance of a compromissory clause in
the 1955 U.S.-Iran Treaty of Amity, providing for ICJ jurisdiction over disputes arising under
that treaty.115 At the same time, the realism strain sought to avoid application of international law
and international dispute resolution to core national interests, thus resulting in the inclusion of a
clause stating that the Treaty of Amity “shall not preclude the application of measures . . .
necessary to protect … essential security interests.”116 Iran —a state weaker than the United
States in terms of military and economic power— used the Court to challenge the deployment of
114
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U.S. power in the Persian Gulf, specifically U.S. attacks against Iranian oil installations in 198788. After the filing of Iran’s 1992 application initiating the case, American realism might have
led the United States to simply ignore it; to decline to participate in proceedings, where it had no
comparative advantage vis-à-vis Iran, and where it was politically vulnerable to adverse findings.
Yet the early 1990’s was period of resurgent institutionalism in the United States. Institutionalist
landmarks of this period, which would not have been possible without proactive U.S.
engagement, were the extraordinary multilateralism of the U.N.-authorized action against Iraq,
the operation in Somalia, and the creation of new tribunals such as the U.N. Compensation
Commission, as well as the war crimes tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
Thus, consistent with the spirit of that remarkable age, the United States elected to
participate in the proceedings, and ultimately pursued a strategy with realism and institutionalism
prongs. The realism prong emphasized that states had not given the Court plenary jurisdiction
over disputes; that the Court’s jurisdiction only extended so far as states had consented; and that,
in this case, the United States had not consented to review of its military operations through the
vehicle of a largely commercial treaty. The United States succeeded on most of these points,
successfully winnowing Iran’s claims down to a single treaty provision concerning freedom of
commerce between the two states117 and convincing the bench that such commerce was not
disrupted by the attacks on the oil platforms.118
At the same time, the United States had an institutionalist prong to its case. Arguing that
the actions it took were necessary to protect “essential security interests” (and thus outside the
scope of the treaty), the United States in essence sought to convince the Court that the attacks on
Iranian oil platforms were legitimate self-defense. This prong held out hope that the Court would
serve as an impartial arbiter of complicated facts and would acknowledge the rights of even a
powerful state to defend itself, without an eye to the invasion of Iraq unfolding at the same time
as oral hearings in the case. On this prong, the United States failed. Even though the Court found
that the United States had not violated the Treaty of Amity by interrupting bilateral commerce
with Iran, it had engaged in an extensive analysis of why the attacks on the oil platforms violated
international law on the use of force, an analysis questioned thereafter by the U.S. Department of
117

Id., art. X(1); see Oil Platforms (Iran. v. U.S.), 1996 ICJ 803 (judgment on preliminary objections).

118

See Oil Platforms (Iran. v. U.S.), paras. 98-99 (ICJ Nov. 6, 2003), 42 ILM 1334, 1367-68 (2003)

119

39

State Legal Adviser.

In the Oil Platforms judgment, the Court neglected resorting to one of the mediating
techniques available to address the realism/institutionalism antimony. The Court’s willingness to
address the legality of the use of force by the United States even though the Court had no
jurisdiction over the case is a “pushing back” against the realist approach of denying the Court
plenary jurisdiction. While such action, or reaction, by the Court may be understandable, there
may be collateral consequences.
First, the judgment exposes the Court to arguments that it was not acting as an impartial
decision-maker, but was set on lecturing the United States at a time when use of military force in
Iraq in 2003 was being harshly criticized.120 Further, the fact that the “essential security
interests” clause failed to insulate the United States from the Court casts into doubt the efficacy
of such provisions in a myriad of existing treaties providing for ICJ jurisdiction, and will
encourage the U.S. government to periodically consider whether and how it might withdraw
from or modify such treaties to avoid litigation.121 Certainly, the cost/benefit analysis of this
particular Treaty of Amity strongly suggests that it should be terminated: the United States has
engaged in little economic activity and no consular activity with Iran for twenty-five years,122 yet
it is exposed at any time to suit by Iran under the treaty’s compromissory clause. Moreover,
many in the U.S. government will perceive the Court’s willingness to lecture the United States as
confirmation that compromissory clauses providing for the Court’s jurisdiction should not be
119
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included in new treaties. Finally, the ultimate effect of the decision is probably to foreclose any
possibility of U.S. adherence to the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction. If there is no way to carve
out national security interests without inviting the judges to engage in an extended discussion of
the underlying matter, even in situations where the United States ultimately succeeds in avoiding
the Court’s jurisdiction, then many will conclude that the U.S. has no business at the Peace
Palace.
3.b.ii. Israeli Wall Advisory Opinion
The United States’ tendency toward exceptionalism may be seen in its attitude toward the
recent advisory opinion on the legality of the barrier by Israel in the occupied West Bank of the
Jordan River. On December 8, 2003, the General Assembly adopted a resolution asking the ICJ
for an advisory opinion on “the legal consequences arising from the construction of the wall
being built by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in
and around East Jerusalem . . . .”123 The resolution received 90 votes in favor, 74 abstentions,
and 8 opposed (including the United States). In opposing the resolution, the U.S. representative
stated:
“The international community has long recognized that resolution of the [IsraeliPalestinian] conflict must be through negotiated settlement, as called for in Security
Council resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973). That was spelled out clearly to the
parties in the terms of reference of the Madrid Peace Conference of 1991. Involving the
International Court of Justice in this conflict is inconsistent with that approach and could
actually delay a two-State solution and negatively impact road map implementation.
Furthermore, referral of this issue to the International Court of Justice risks politicizing
the Court. It will not advance the Court’s ability to contribute to global security, nor will
it advance the prospects of peace”.124
resolved.
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The United States instead favored pursuing the “Quartet’s road map”—a plan that the
United States, the European Union, the Russian Federation, and the U.N. Secretary-General
developed in 2003 to further the process (initiated at the 1991 Madrid Conference) for peacefully
resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.125 Thus, the United States was committed to an
approach for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict entailing diplomacy by a restricted group of powers,
not by the international community at large. The United States opposed submitting this matter to
the World Court because doing so could intrude upon the unique ability of the major powers to
influence and shape the peace process.
Of course, in its written pleadings to the Court the United States did not advance legal
arguments predicated on exceptionalism, for there was no legal basis for doing so. Instead, it
sought to take advantage of some of the mediating techniques referred to above. It argued that
the Court should decline to answer the question of grounds of judicial propriety because the
question was not an abstract enquiry, but, in essence, a bilateral dispute in disguise.126 The
United States hoped to convince the judges that they would be stepping over the bounds of the
structural constraints on the Court’s jurisdiction if they were to pass upon a dispute when the
relevant parties to that dispute had not consented to jurisdiction. Implicit in this argument was a
further argument that it was improper to decide a bilateral dispute between two parties when one
of the parties had not yet even been recognized by the United Nations as a sovereign state (a
decision in part controlled by the Security Council), and, therefore, could not appear before the
Court. Further, the United States stressed that it was not for the Court to address an issue that
was more properly addressed through political negotiations.127
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Ultimately, the Court determined that answering the question would not impede the
Middle East peace process. That conclusion was no doubt shared by a majority of states
represented in the General Assembly, as was the Court’s conclusion on the merits that Israel was
violating international law by constructing the barrier. Yet, from the perspective of American
exceptionalism, the majority of states can very well be wrong about whether it is a good idea to
involve the Court in this issue, and also misguided more generally in their opposition to Israeli
policies. The Court’s attitude in the advisory opinion may well reflect the dominant views of
policy-makers in other countries, but for the exceptionalist, that does not mean the Court is right.
3.b.iii. Breard/LaGrand/Avena cases
The recent cases concerning the treatment of aliens on death row in the United States
highlights the antinomy created by the American democratic and constitutional tradition. The
crux of the Breard/LaGrand/Avena line of cases is that aliens arrested by law-enforcement
officials often have not been advised of their right to have their consulate notified of their arrest,
something states party to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Vienna Convention)
have agreed to do.128 Some aliens, thereafter, have been convicted of serious crimes and
sentenced to death. Paraguay, Germany, and Mexico each brought a case against the United
States before the ICJ by invoking the Optional Protocol Concerning Compulsory Settlement of
Disputes to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.129 In each instance, the applicant
asked the Court to indicate provisional measures of protection, namely that the individuals would
not be executed prior to a decision by the Court on the merits. Germany and Mexico also asked
the Court for decisions on the merits regarding whether the United States had violated its
obligations under the Vienna Convention and what consequences should flow from those
violations. The United States has fully participated (when permitted) in all aspects of these cases
before the Court, presenting extensive written and oral pleadings.
The U.S. reaction to the Breard/LaGrand/Avena line of cases may be considered in terms
of both the Court’s provisional orders and the decisions on the merits. In all three cases, the
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Court issued an order on provisional measures that the United States “take all measures at its
disposal to ensure” (Breard, LaGrand) or “all measures necessary to ensure” (Avena) that the
relevant aliens not be executed pending a final decision by the Court.130 Prior to the Court’s final
judgment in the LaGrand case, the U.S. government argued both to the ICJ and to U.S. courts
that such an order on provisional measures was not legally binding, and further that it had no
direct effect in the U.S. legal system. Such a position has realism overtones, but the dominant
feature appears to have been a concern to preserve the constitutional autonomy of the several
states, and a political concern with intruding upon the democratic decision by those states to use
the death penalty in their penal processes. Weighing that concern against the reality that the
American constitutional system does incorporate international law, the U.S. government looked
for credible legal arguments for why the Court’s decision was not binding and not a part of U.S.
law. Thus, after the first provisional measures order was issued on April 9, 1998 in the Breard
case, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a brief before the U.S. Supreme Court stating that:
“The better reasoned position is that such an order is not binding. Article 41(1) of
the ICJ statute provides that the ICJ shall have “the power to indicate any provisional
measures which ought to be taken to preserve the respective rights of either power.”
Article 41(2) further states that, “[p]ending the final decision [of the ICJ], notice of the
measures suggested shall forthwith be given to the parties and the Security Council.” The
use of precatory language (“indicate,” “ought to be taken,” “suggested”) instead of
stronger language (e.g.: the ICJ may “order” provisional measures that “shall” be
taken) strongly supports a conclusion that ICJ provisional measures are not binding on
the parties. The distinction in Article 41(2) between the “final decision” ultimately
foreseen and the “measures suggested” in the interim also suggests that the “measures
suggested” are not binding.
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Petitioners have relied on the United Nations Charter to argue that provisional
measures are binding, but the language of the Charter does not support that conclusion.
Article 94(1) provides that “[e]ach member . . . undertakes to comply with the decision of
the [ICJ] in any case to which it is a party.” (Emphasis added.) “The decision,” in the
context of Article 94(1) of the Charter, evidently refers to the final decision of the
International Court. Article 94(2) of the Charter elaborates that “[i]f any party to a case
fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it by a judgment rendered by the [ICJ],
the other party may have recourse to the Security Council.” (Emphasis added.)
Significantly, the Security Council has never acted to enforce provisional measures
indicated by the ICJ. See Restatement [Third on the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States], at 368 (discussing Security Council’s response to ICJ’s order indicating
provisional measures in dispute between United Kingdom and Iran).
Moreover, the ICJ itself has never concluded that provisional measures are
binding on the parties to a dispute. That court has indicated provisional measures in
seven other cases of which we are aware; in most of those cases, the order indicating
provisional measures was not regarded as binding by the respondent.131
In addition to these representations to the U.S. Supreme Court, the U.S. Secretary of State
sent a letter to the Governor of Virginia requesting that he stay the execution of Breard since the
“execution of Mr. Breard in the face of the Court’s April 9 action could be seen as a denial by
the United States of the significance of international law and the Court’s processes in its
international relations and thereby limit our ability to ensure that Americans are protected when
living or traveling abroad.”132 Here, again, may be seen a balancing act, in which the State
Department sought to uphold U.S. adherence to international law and institutions, while
respecting the constitutional autonomy of Virginia.
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The Supreme Court denied the petitions for certiorari that had been filed in the case.133 It
did not focus on the binding nature of the ICJ’s provisional measures order. Rather, it said that it
was “clear that Breard procedurally defaulted his claim, if any, under the Vienna Convention by
failing to raise that claim in the state courts.”134 Further, the Court stated:
“[W]hile we should give respectful consideration to the interpretation of an
international treaty rendered by an international court with jurisdiction to interpret such,
it has been recognized in international law that, absent a clear and express statement to
the contrary, the procedural rules of the forum State govern the implementation of the
treaty in that State. . . . This proposition is embodied in the Vienna Convention itself,
which provides that the rights expressed in the Convention “shall be exercised in
conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State,” provided that “said
laws and regulations must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the
rights accorded under this Article are intended.” Article 36(2), 21 U.S. T., at 101. . . .
Second, although treaties are recognized by our Constitution as the supreme law
of the land, that status is no less true of provisions of the Constitution itself, to which
rules of procedural default apply. We have held “that an Act of Congress . . . is on a full
parity with a treaty, and that when a statute which is subsequent in time is inconsistent
with a treaty, the statute to the extent of conflict renders the treaty null.” Reid v. Covert,
354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957) (plurality opinion) . . . . The Vienna Convention—which arguably
confers on an individual the right to consular assistance following arrest—has
continuously been in effect since 1969. But in 1996, before Breard filed his habeas
petition raising claims under the Vienna Convention, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), which provides that a habeas petitioner
alleging that he is held in violation of “treaties of the United States” will, as a general
rule, not be afforded an evidentiary hearing if he “has failed to develop the factual basis
of [the] claim in State court proceedings.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), (e)(2) [(2000]).”135
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After the Supreme Court denied the petitions for certiorari, the Governor of Virginia
decided not to stay the execution, and Breard was executed.
The World Court’s order on provisional measures in the LaGrand case was issued on
March 3, 1999, at 7 p.m. (Hague time) without having heard the views of the U.S.
government.136 In the late afternoon of March 3, the U.S. government transmitted the order to the
Governor of Arizona. Just before the scheduled execution, Germany filed a case before the U.S.
Supreme Court against the United States and Arizona seeking a temporary restraining order or
preliminary injunction to enforce the order of the ICJ. The U.S. Solicitor General filed a letter
opposing any stay, asserting that the “Vienna Convention does not furnish a basis for this Court
to grant a stay of execution,” and that “an order of the International Court of Justice indicating
provisional measures is not binding and does not furnish a basis for judicial relief.” In declining
to exercise its original jurisdiction (with two justices dissenting), the Supreme Court explained in
part:
“[A] foreign government’s ability here to assert a claim against a State [i.e.,
Arizona] is without evident support in the Vienna Convention and in probable
contravention of the Eleventh Amendment [to the U.S. Constitution] principles. This
action was filed within only two hours of a scheduled execution that was ordered on
January 15, 1999, based upon a sentence imposed by Arizona in 1984, about which the
Federal Republic of Germany learned in 1992. Given the tardiness of the pleas and the
jurisdictional barriers they implicate, we decline to exercise our original jurisdiction”.137
In dissent, Justices Breyer and Stevens said that they favored a stay of the execution to
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give more time to brief fully “the jurisdictional and international legal issues involved.”138 The
Governor of Arizona decided not to stay. Walter LaGrand was executed on March 4, 1999.139
While the executions in Breard and LaGrand in the face of the ICJ’s order on the surface
may suggest a complete U.S. disregard for the views of the Court, the United States took
seriously the issue of whether it was bound by such orders, and reached an entirely plausible
conclusion that they did not. Yet the animating feature of the American position was the problem
presented by federal-state relations. Criminal justice in the United States is a matter almost
entirely left to the several states; persons committing crimes in this country are typically tried
under state laws and often in state courts. Further, whether to adopt the death penalty is a matter
left to each state; some have elected to include the death penalty as a possible sanction whereas
others have abolished or never had it. Those laws are adopted by the peoples of the states,
through enactments by elected state legislators. The decision to convict a violent criminal and to
impose the death penalty is a matter decided by the local community in form of an indictment by
a grand jury, and a conviction and sentencing by a jury of the offender’s peers. For the federal
government to intrude upon that process by declaring that an execution must be stayed due to the
decision of a court consisting almost entirely of foreigners residing an ocean away would have
been an extraordinary and deeply unpopular undertaking by any administration, Democratic or
Republican.
Despite the executions in Breard and LaGrand, the U.S. government embarked on an
aggressive campaign to educate and train state law enforcement officers regarding obligations
arising under the Vienna Convention, to the point of printing cards that officers were to carry
with them and read out when arresting an alien.140 Moreover, after the Court held, in its
judgment on the merits of the LaGrand case141, that provisional measures orders were binding,
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and the further provisional measures order was issued in the Avena case,142 the United States did
not publicly reject the Avena measures. Rather, it sought to implement them, albeit with
extraordinary difficulty, principally by encouraging the commutation of death sentences of the
relevant convicts by governors or parole boards. 143
One of the central problems for the federal government in these cases concerned the
“procedural default rule,” a rule designed to help limit federal court review of state court
decisions. In brief, under the procedural default rule, state law procedural rulings that are both
sufficiently independent from federal law and adequate to sustain the judgment against the
defendant (“procedural defaults”) often preclude consideration of the merits of federal legal
claims. Thus, if a defendant fails to file in state court proceedings a timely motion for a new trial
or sentencing proceeding because he was not informed of his right to request consular
notification, that procedural failure may bar filing such a motion not only thereafter before that
state’s courts, but also before federal courts.
Turning to the judgments in LaGrand and Avena,144 the Court found that the United
States had violated its obligations under the Vienna Convention by not informing the aliens of
their right of consular notification, by not notifying their consulates of their detentions, and by
effectively depriving the consulates of the ability to communicate with and have access to the
aliens. In both cases, the Court also found that the failure to provide judicial review of the aliens’
convictions and sentences in light of the lack of notification constituted a further violation of the
Vienna Convention. As for what the United States must do prospectively, in LaGrand the Court
stated that, “should nationals of the Federal Republic of Germany nonetheless be sentenced to
severe penalties”, without their right to consular notification having been respected, the United
States, “by means of its own choosing, shall allow the review and reconsideration of the
conviction and sentence by taking account of the violation of the rights set forth” in the Vienna
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The Court reached a similar finding on “review and reconsideration” with respect

to the some fifty Mexican nationals at issue in the Avena case.146 As to how such “review and
reconsideration” should occur, the International Court found in both LaGrand and Avena that a
procedural default rule cannot justify precluding review of a petitioner’s claim.147 Further, the
Court found in both cases that Article 36 of the Vienna Convention creates “individual rights,”
which arguably means rights enforceable in U.S. courts.148 Apparently with an eye to the U.S.
approach of relying on governors and parole boards to commute death sentences in light of the
Vienna Convention violations, the Court in Avena also stated that the process must entail “a
procedure which guarantees that full weight is given to the violations of the rights set forth in the
Vienna Convention” and “should occur within the overall judicial proceedings relating to the
individual defendant concerned.”149 The Court specifically noted that “the clemency process, as
currently practised within the United States criminal justice system, does not appear to meet the
requirements.”150
The initial fall-out from the decisions on the merits in LaGrand and Avena is a story of
the federal government encouraging the various states to take into account the decisions of the
International Court, without actually telling the states that they must do so as a matter of federal
law. Not surprisingly, different courts went in different directions. In Madej v. Schomig, a federal
district court found that the LaGrand judgment on the merits foreclosed strict reliance by U.S.
courts on the procedural default rule for violations of the Vienna Convention.151 In Torres v.
Oklahoma, a concurring state court judge found that the state court was bound by the Vienna
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Convention Optional Protocol to abide by the International Court’s Avena decision.152 At the
same time, a state court in Cauthern v. Tennessee concluded that, notwithstanding the
International Court’s judgments, the Vienna Convention does not create an individual right that
is privately enforceable in the United States, nor that violations of the Vienna Convention may
be raised as part of a petition for post-conviction relief.153 Similarly, in Medellin v. Dretke, the
Fifth Circuit found that the Supreme Court’s order denying certiorari in the Breard case
supported application of the procedural default rule regardless of what the International Court
said in its LaGrand and Avena judgments, and further that the Vienna Convention did not create
an individual right that is privately enforceable.154
In December 2004, the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari in the Medellin case.
The U.S. government filed in February 2005 an amicus brief urging the Court to affirm the Court
of Appeals. Playing strongly to the vision of democratic and constitutional autonomy, the
government argued that Article 36 of the Vienna Convention does not provide a basis for private
judicial enforcement in U.S. courts. The government supported this position through an analysis
of the language and structure of the Convention, read in context, its ratification history, and state
practice, as well as the long-standing position of the Executive Branch.155 While the International
Court’s position might imply a right of private judicial enforcement in U.S. courts, the
government asserted: “While the ICJ’s understanding of the Convention’s requirements is
entitled to respectful consideration, it is ultimately the responsibility of this [U.S. Supreme]
Court to interpret the meaning of a federal treaty.”156 The government also argued that the
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Convention does not preclude application by U.S. courts of the procedural default rule. The
government stated that the International Court was simply wrong when it found otherwise.
“[T]he ICJ in LaGrand concluded that applying procedural default to bar
consideration of a challenge to a defendant’s conviction and sentence violates [Vienna
Convention] Article 36(2)’s requirement that laws of the forum state “must enable full
effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under this Article are
intended.” But a general “full effect” clause cannot be understood to override
application of rules that are as deeply embedded in the criminal justice system as rules of
procedural default. . . . [W]hile the ICJ’s interpretation of Article 36(2) is entitled to
respectful consideration, it does not provide a basis for the [U.S. Supreme] Court to
overrule its controlling decision in Breard”.157
As for whether the International Court’s decision in the Avena judgment could itself be
privately enforced in U.S. courts, the government argued that it could not. The arguments were:
(1) while the United States adhered to the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention, that
protocol operates only to grant jurisdiction to the International Court over Vienna Convention
disputes—it does not commit the United States to comply with the ICJ’s judgment, nor make the
judgment privately enforceable in a criminal proceeding by an individual; (2) rather, U.S.
compliance with ICJ judgments is addressed in the U.N. Charter, which creates an international
duty upon the United States to comply with the judgment,158 but does not make the ICJ judgment
privately enforceable in court; (3) the mechanism for taking non-compliance before the U.N.
Security Council confirms that ICJ judgments were not meant to be privately enforceable; (4) the
U.S. ratification history confirms this interpretation, as does the one U.S. court decision that has
addressed the matter; (5) the ICJ Statute states that ICJ judgments have no binding effect except
between the parties in the case, thus negating the possibility of private judicial enforcement; and
(6) the International Court itself stated that the U.S. obligation was to provide, by means of its
157
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own choosing, review and reconsideration, which means that the U.S. political branches are
entitled to pursue the matter by a choice of their means.159
Despite this strong statement in favor of autonomy, the government accepted that it had
an international obligation to abide by the International Court’s judgment and, further, decided
that it had to do something about that obligation vis-à-vis the several states. Accordingly,
President Bush on February 28, 2005, issued a memorandum to the Attorney General stating:
“The United States is a party to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
(the “Convention”) and the Convention’s Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory
Settlement of Disputes (Optional Protocol), which gives the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) jurisdiction to decide disputes concerning the “interpretation and application” of
the Convention.
I have determined, pursuant to the authority vested in me as President by the
Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, that the United States will
discharge its international obligations under the decision of the International Court of
Justice in the Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United
States of America) (Avena), 2004 ICJ 128 (Mar. 31), by having State courts give effect to
the decision in accordance with general principles of comity in cases filed by the 51
Mexican nationals addressed in that decision”.160
Thus, although the U.S. government argued against the direct incorporation into domestic
law of international obligations emanating from the Vienna Convention, or from the judgments
of the International Court, the government proceeded to demand compliance by the states with
the Avena judgment on the basis of the President’s “constitutional foreign affairs authority and
his authority under Article 94 of the U.N. Charter.”161 In November 2006, the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals rejected the U.S. government’s approach, stating that
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we hold that the President’s memorandum ordering us to give effect to the ICJ Avena
decision cannot be sustained under the express or implied constitutional powers of the
President relied on by Medellín and the United States or under any power granted to the
President by an act of Congress cited by Medellín and the United States. As such, the
President has violated the separation of powers doctrine by intruding into the domain of
the judiciary, and therefore, Medellín cannot show that the President’s memorandum
preempts [Texas procedural law].159
The final act of the Medellín case is yet to be written,160 but for now that U.S.
government’s approach can be seen with the context of the third antimony. The government’s
approach maintained the overall democratic and constitutional autonomy of the United States,
while simultaneously seeking to achieve compliance as a matter of comity with the International
Court’s judgment. At the same time, the United States moved to ensure that it would never again
be placed in such a position. On March 7, 2005, the government informed the U.N. SecretaryGeneral that it terminated its adherence to the Optional Protocol, thereby foreclosing future cases
against the United States before the International Court based on the basis of that protocol.162
When one steps back from the intricacies of these cases, the overall thrust of both the
Supreme Court’s and International Court’s decisions may reflect an unfortunate movement away
from the normal approaches for mediating the autonomous national law/embedded national law
antinomy. In the context of both Breard and LaGrand, the U.S. Supreme Court showed little
sensitivity in trying to find a way forward for the United States in a manner consistent with its
international obligations. The long-standing approach of the Supreme Court under the Charming
power: United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936); Amer. Ins. Assoc. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S.
396 (2003); Dames & Moore, v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United
States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
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to interpret U.S. law, whenever possible and however possible, to avoid clashes

with international law seems quite absent through the course of these proceedings. The issue of
the death penalty is politically charged in the United States and the issue of federalism is
complicated, but the Supreme Court has found ways to uphold international commitments, even
in recent years and even in situations where federalism concerns are squarely at stake.164
As for the International Court, normally international dispute fora have accepted that
they have the power to determine that a state has acted unlawfully and, as a consequence, to
order reparations. Such fora, however, have generally avoided ordering of specific performance
by a state, preferring not to interfere in internal national processes. While ordering that specific
acts be taken internally is by no means unprecedented,165 international fora, by and large, accept
that the autonomy of states must be respected; that there is only so far an international court or
tribunal may go before its authority will be rejected. In the Breard/LaGrand/Avena line of cases,
the International Court showed considerable sensitivity to considerations of autonomy when it
ordered that the United States, “by means of its own choosing . . . allow the review and
reconsideration” of convictions and sentences. Yet despite this, the Court was remarkably willing
to assume an authority to oversee the detailed circumstances of criminal law cases unfolding
before U.S. state and federal courts, concerning crimes committed in the United States against
U.S. nationals, and to order the United States to undertake further review of the cases through its
judicial system. Were the Court’s judgments firmly anchored in language of the Vienna
Convention setting forth what type of remedy should flow from a violation, then the resistance of
the United States to the Court’s judgments would be much less defensible. As it is, however, it is
understandable that the United States was a bit surprised to find that, by joining the Vienna
Convention’s optional protocol, it inadvertently laid the basis for the International Court to
upend U.S. state court proceedings.
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For Europeans, the concept of a supra-national court reaching decisions that directly
affect the lives of individuals is nothing new; the European Court on Human Rights has existed
for almost fifty years, and has handed down hundreds of cases that reach deeply into the national
legal systems of EU member states. Likewise, the European Court of Justice reaches directly into
national legal systems in various ways. Regional human rights courts in the Americas and now in
Africa have a less strong pedigree, but nevertheless, for states adhering to their jurisdiction, the
concept of such supra-national adjudication as having effects on internal decision-making is
understood. For Americans, however, there is no such tradition of allowing intrusion into the
U.S. legal system (for example, the United States has never accepted the jurisdiction of the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights).
One often sees reference to the U.S. willingness to adhere to compulsory dispute
settlement before the World Trade Organization, and explanations for doing so tend to focus on
trade law being a more “technical” area or that the United States is in a relatively weaker
position vis-à-vis other states (China, the EU, Japan) on trade matters than on other matters.
Those issues are important, but it should also be noted that the outcome of WTO decisionmaking does not directly intrude into the U.S. legal system. There is no mechanism by which a
WTO panel decision has a legally binding effect upon an internal U.S. entity, such as a state
court. Rather, the result of a U.S. loss at the WTO is that the U.S. government has a choice to
make: conform its law or practice; or face WTO-authorized retaliation.166
The result in the Breard/LaGrand/Avena line of cases is different. There is no mechanism
by which the United States can simply accept that Mexico will also not conduct full-fledged
judicial review of the effects of violations of the Vienna Convention (were such an option
available, the United States would likely accept it). Instead, the only avenue for redress is that
directed by the International Court, which purports to have a dispositive effect on the decisionmaking of sub-state entities. In this sense, adherence to the jurisdiction of the International Court
—in terms of its effects on U.S. democratic decision-making and constitutional autonomy— is
sentence were not themselves the unlawful acts.
166

Similarly, in the context of NAFTA Chapter 11 dispute resolution, the United States has a choice:

conform its law or practice (invariably, the law or practice of one of the several states with respect to a foreign
investor) or pay damages.

56
considerably different from adherence to WTO decision-making.
4. Conclusion
The formal means for mediating antimonies have been largely unchanged since the
inception of the Court: the Court has jurisdiction over many disputes, but that jurisdiction is
circumscribed (as recognized in Yugoslavia’s Legality of Use of Force cases); the judges reflect
the global community, but also the major powers; etc. Yet, the Court may have entered a phase
where it is more likely to resist the constraints on its power contained within those formal means
and less likely to attempt to reconcile antinomies. Although only states may appear before the
Court, the Court now finds that a non-state entity (Palestine) may do so if a dispute is submitted
in the guise of an advisory opinion. While its jurisdiction is circumscribed, the Court is
comfortable engaging in an extended review of the legality of the use of military force by the
United States based on a treaty that the Court has found was not violated. While the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations, and other relevant treaties, contain no provisions regarding
the effect of violations of the Convention upon national court proceedings, the Court sees no
difficulty in determining that U.S. courts must engage in further judicial review of criminal
convictions and sentences, trumping local procedural rules. One gets the impression that the
Court —fifty years after its creation— is tired of some of the formal constraints that applied
earlier in its life and —looking around at the robustness of dispute resolution in other
international fora— is ready to expand the reach of its power.
Moreover, it may be that some of the informal means for mediating antimonies have been
lost in the past twenty years. While the Court’s concern with its reputation and legitimacy in the
first thirty years of its existence served as important political constraint in the Court’s
relationship with all states, including the United States, over the past twenty years that same
concern has lead to several clashes with the United States foremost, but also the UK and France.
Having stood up to the United States in the Nicaragua case, the Court became a hero to the states
of the developing world, and ushered in a period of increased activity on its docket. Of the cases
filed before the International Court since its inception, approximately forty percent were filed in
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Thus, while from 1947 to 1989, the Court received on its docket

approximately two cases per year, after 1990 the Court received more than three cases per year.
The U.S. withdrawal from the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction has far from crippled the Court;
arguably, it has enhanced the Court’s stature as a place of authority in interstate relations
unbeholden to the major powers. For the Court, the lesson may be not to tread lightly with
respect to the United States but, rather, to tread heavily unless doing so would be viewed
generally as bias.
In its foreign policies, contemporary America appears to be going a different route than
much of the world, even its former close allies in Europe. The consequence is that the judges of
the ICJ now reflect predominantly the views of states with whom the United States often
disagrees. Perhaps this reflects success in the prescription for the Court made by Richard Falk in
his 1986 book, Reviving the World Court.168 Falk argued for the Court to turn away from what he
viewed as Anglo-American and West European ways of thinking, and move more toward
reflecting the viewpoints associated with non-Western legal traditions (including, at that time,
Marxist outlooks on law). Arguably, this is now what has happened, which has strengthened the
Court’s position among most states of the world, but seriously alienated the United States.
The antinomies identified in Part II are unlikely to be resolved through the further
development of formal or informal techniques for mediation. While the United States is not
happy with the decisions being rendered by the Court, there is no support in the global
community for altering the formal mechanisms by which the Court operates. If the United States
saw concrete benefits in being more closely associated with the Court, it might look for ways to
improve relationships, but for the world’s premier superpower the benefits appear slim while the
costs appear quite high. Consequently, the United States may take steps to further remove itself
from the reach of the ICJ’s jurisdiction, through terminating some or all of the outstanding
treaties that provide for the Court’s jurisdiction. In the near term, U.S. policymakers will seek to
avoid any involvement in matters before the ICJ, while the Court may well welcome
opportunities to speak to the legality of U.S. actions.
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